(REVISED FOR NBI PROGRAM ON THE LAW OF THE INTERNET IN GEORGIA)
By Rob Hassett, Casey Gilson P.C., Atlanta, Georgia
Earlier versions of this article appeared in the program materials for the internet law seminar sponsored by NBI, Inc. which was held in Atlanta, Georgia on February 18, 1998 and the January 1997 issue of The Multimedia & Technology Licensing Law Report published, at that time, by Warren, Gorham & Lamont, and currently published by West Group. That article was based on program materials developed by the writer in connection with his presentation at the Cutting Edge Music Conference in New Orleans, Louisiana in August of 1996.
The writer wishes to thank Lori Brill and Lynn Hassett, attorneys in his law firm when he wrote the article, as well as Adam Alexander, an attorney at the law firm of Cooper & Scully, in Dallas, Texas, for their help in updating this Article.
© 2000 Rob Hassett, All Rights Reserved.
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Today, interactive media incorporates video, music and still photography. When may a producer of interactive media use an individual’s name, likeness, or identity without permission? Restrictions on the use of names, likenesses and identities of individuals are governed by the right of publicity and two categories of the right of privacy.
Section 46 of the Restatement of the Law Third, Unfair Competition, states in pertinent part:
One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate. (1)
Section 652A of the Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, states in pertinent part:
The right of privacy is invaded by: … (b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness…; (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life….; (2)
The elements of appropriation of invasion of privacy are the same as for violation of the right of publicity with one exception. The invasion of the right of privacy is a personal tort and it generally may not be assigned or inherited. Whereas, the right of publicity, a property right, may generally be assigned and inherited. See, e.g., Martin Luther King Jr. Center For Social Change v. American Heritage Products, 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
English common law did not recognize the right of privacy or publicity except to the extent that such rights existed tangentially under copyright and trademark law. In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and future Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis wrote an article arguing that a right of privacy should exist. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). The first court to accept the right of privacy was the Georgia Supreme Court in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). The Georgia Supreme Court held that Mr. Pavesich stated a claim against New England Life for alleged wrongful use of his picture in an advertisement for the Defendant’s insurance products. Today, privacy and publicity rights are based on state common and statutory law. Because these rights are relatively new and different legislatures and courts decide how they apply, there are variations in the interpretation and application of these rights.
Since the Pavesich case, some form of the right of privacy relating to appropriation and/or the right of publicity has been adopted either by statute or court decision in every state that has addressed the issue. Minnesota and Virginia appear to be the only states which have rejected right to privacy involving giving unreasonable publicity to an individual’s private life. See Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 226 N.W.2d 921 (1975) and Williams v. Nathan, 21 Med. L. Rptr. 1339 (E.D. Va. 1993); Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1983).
To avoid violating these rights, the best approach is to obtain a written consent from each person whose name, likeness, or identity will be included in a multimedia production. There are three reasons why consent should be obtained in writing. First, unless in writing, some state statutes provide that such consents are not valid. See, J. Thomas McCarthy, The Right of Publicity and Privacy, § 10.6 (1996). Second, there could be a dispute about the existence of an oral consent. Finally, unless the consent is in writing, there could be confusion concerning its scope.
There are often situations in which it is impractical to obtain written consent, and one must decide whether or not to use a particular photograph or video for an interactive media production. Situations in which such use is permitted include the reporting of newsworthy events and uses in which no person is identified or identifiable. Courts generally hold the reporting of newsworthy events to be allowed under the First Amendment which forbids any laws “abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.”
Assuming that the individual is not violating anyone’s copyrights, there are four circumstances in which the use of photographs, films and/or videos is permitted. First, the use of photographs, films and videos of buildings or other structures taken from public streets and similar non-restricted areas in which individuals are not recognizable does not violate anyone’s privacy or publicity rights. The exception to this rule is the unusual situation where false information or embarrassing private facts about an individual connected with a building or structure is included in the production. The reason is that privacy and publicity rights relate to individuals and not to buildings or other structures. See, e.g., Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So.2d 1386 (La. 1979).
Second, only individuals who are recognizable in a photograph or video have any claim for misappropriation of likeness or identity. Therefore, morphing pictures and videos so individuals are not recognizable eliminates any privacy and publicity right claims. See, e.g., Cheatham v. Paisano Publications, 891 F.Supp. 381 (W.D. Ken. 1995), where the Court said that there was a jury question whether or not the Plaintiff’s posterior was recognizable in the particular photograph.
In Pesina v. Midway, 948 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ill.1996), a martial artist hired to model for characters of the coin operated arcade games Mortal Kombat and Mortal Kombat II alleged that use of his name and likeness in subsequent home video games violated his common law right of publicity. Mr. Pesina’s movements had been captured on video, digitized, and incorporated into the games after extensive editing. The district court granted Midway’s motion for summary judgment in part because Midway was able to show that the public did not recognize Mr. Pesina within the game. “[A]fter comparing Mr. Pesina and the game character, Johnny Cage, who allegedly resembles the plaintiff, only 6% of 306 Mortal Kombat users identified Mr. Pesina as the model.” Id. at 42. The brief use of Pesina’s name in the game (for eight seconds only when a player won), although unauthorized, also was held to not constitute a right of publicity claim.
Third, photographs, videos, and films taken of participants and spectators in connection with a newsworthy event may be used in photo essays and documentaries of the event. In Cheatham v. Paisano Publications, supra, the Plaintiff was a jean “designer” who wore one of her own “designs” to a Kentucky bikers’ convention. She had cut out the bottom of a pair of jeans and replaced it with fishnet fabric. A magazine published a photo essay of the event which included pictures of her wearing her special outfit. She sued the magazine and claimed that it misappropriated her identity. In dismissing her claim, the Court held that the photo essay was a report of a newsworthy event. See also, Time, Inc. and Steve Kagan v. Sand Creek Partners, L.P., 825 F.Supp. 210 (S.D. Ind. 1993). The Court in Cheatham also held that use of the Plaintiff’s pictures on T-shirts was not a protected newsworthy use and, if the Plaintiff were recognizable from the picture, then Plaintiff would have a basis for a claim.
There are limitations on the use of name, likeness, and identity in connection with reporting news. For example, in the movie “Woodstock” there is an extensive interview with an individual responsible for cleaning latrines. This interviewee sued for misappropriation of his right of privacy. The Court held that he was made an “involuntary performer” due to the extensive interview and allowed the case to proceed to trial. See Taggart v. Wadleigh-Maurice, Ltd., 489 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1973). Additionally, copying a performer’s entire performance goes beyond the allowed reporting of a newsworthy event and constitutes a violation of the performer’s right of publicity. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co., 433 U.S. 564 (1977). Also where a performance is staged using actors, such as a professional wrestling match, it is unlikely a Court would hold it to be newsworthy. See, e.g., Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995).
Finally, use of names, pictures and identities in connection with the production of biographies of newsworthy individuals is permissible. In Harris Matthews v. Random House, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, applying Texas law, held that a book detailing the author’s and her ex-husband’s experiences as undercover agents did not violate the privacy or publicity rights of her ex-husband. Information concerning their activities and convictions were the subject of news reports. Thus, it was a matter of public record and considered newsworthy events. See, also, Mickey Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2D 790 (Cal. App. 1993), in which Mickey Dora, a surfing legend, appeared in a video documentary entitled “The Legends of Malibu.” The Court held that the use of Dora’s picture was newsworthy.
Uses Not Permitted
There are at least three (3) categories of uses of names, likenesses, and identities of individuals which are never permissible. Those uses involve advertising, using actors and actresses, and exceeding the scope of agreements limiting use of interviews or photographs. First, use of an individual’s name, likeness, or identity in advertising, without that individual’s consent is not permitted. For example, in Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, 249 Va. 387, 457 S.E.2d 356 (1995), the Plaintiff, who had been a successful football player for the Washington Redskins, transferred his interest in a house he owned in Virginia to his ex-wife as part of a divorce settlement. When his wife decided to sell the house, she placed his name and picture prominently on flyers promoting her sale of the house. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Riggins had a claim for infringement of what was, in effect, his right of publicity. See also, Pooley v. National Hole-N-One Assoc., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D.C. Az. 2000) (holding that Plaintiff’s right of publicity was violated because Defendant used video footage of Plaintiff making a “hole in one” in a commercial manner to promote its fundraising program). The aforementioned situation is treated differently from the use of an individual’s name, picture, or identity in connection with advertising in a legitimate newsworthy context. This kind of advertising is permitted. See, e.g., Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (6th Cir. 1995); Lane v. Random House, Inc., 23 Med. L. Rptr. 1385 (D.D.C. 1995). Second, there is no exception to privacy and publicity rights with respect to individuals performing as actors and actresses in dramatic productions. See, e.g., Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., supra.
Third, even where use is newsworthy and does not constitute advertising, unauthorized usage is illegal in instances where the limited purpose for which the interview or pictures was intended is exceeded. In Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 212 Ga. App. 707, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. App. 1994), the Plaintiff appeared on a television program in which he was interviewed about having contracted AIDS. Prior to the program, the Plaintiff and Defendant reached an understanding that the Plaintiff’s face would be disguised digitally so that he could not be identified. Apparently, due to the negligence of station employees, the Plaintiff was recognizable at the beginning of the show. The Court held that the Plaintiff had a claim. See also, Daughtry v. Booth & Random House, 23 Med. L. Rptr. 1215 (Glynn County, Georgia Superior Court 1994).
Parodies are entitled to a substantial degree of First Amendment protection. However, this protection must be balanced against intellectual property rights. See, for example, the Supreme Court’s application of the Doctrine of Fair Use in the copyright law context in Luther R. Campbell, et al. v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1164 (1994). In Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 838 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Okla. 1993), the Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment claiming that it was not a violation of the publicity rights of well-known baseball players to produce and distribute cards with caricatures and names similar to those baseball players and containing text on the back that ridicules the players. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals balanced the publicity rights of the baseball players against the Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to use parody to criticize activities of public figures. The Court held that the Plaintiff was entitled to produce and distribute the cards. But see, White v. Samsung Electronics America, 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1991) in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, over two vigorous dissents, that a print advertisement using a robot that mimicked and parodied the persona of Vanna White infringed her right of publicity. Critics argued that celebrities’ monopolization of words, names and images of general cultural significance would lead to the depletion of the public domain and the stifling of free expression.(3) However, recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that California’s right of publicity protects against uses of one’s image in advertising. Newcombe v. Adolph Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998).
Artistic and Literary Uses
Many times artists employ the use of a name or likeness of a real person in their artistic and literary projects. Although this may not fall under the umbrella of newsworthy events, the First Amendment’s right to free speech often shields forms of expressive art. “The use of the name of a real person as the name … in a title of a work of entertainment” can be immune from liability where it has “some real artistic relevance” to the work and is “not chosen just to exploit the publicity value of the person”. J. Thomas McCarthy, 2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 8:72 (2d ed. 2000).
First amendment protection and the right of publicity recently clashed in a case involving the music industry. In Parks v. LaFace Records, 76 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Mich. 1999), Rosa Parks sued the Defendants to prevent the use of her name as the title of a rap song written, performed, marketed and distributed by the Defendants. Ms. Parks objected to the use of her name due to the content of the song. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that “because the title ‘Rosa Parks’ is not ‘wholly unrelated’ to Defendants’ song, and because the title is the name of an expressive work and not a disguised commercial for a product” the right of publicity did not exist. Id. at 782.
In Guglielmi v. Spelling Goldberg, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454 (1979), the Supreme Court of California skirted the issue by declaring that the right of publicity is not descendible. However, in Chief Justice Bird’s concurrence, he discussed the issue of whether the use of a celebrity’s name and likeness in a fictional film exhibited on television constituted an actionable infringement of that person’s right of publicity. Id. The Chief Justice emphasized that film is “a significant medium for the communication of idea”…and “is protected by the constitutional guarantees of free expression”. Id. at 865. Film is an expression of ideas and is entitled to constitutional protection irrespective of its contribution to the market place. The nature of celebrity and prominence is that they will invite creative comment. Chief Justice Bird concluded that in this situation the value of first amendment protections outweighs the right of publicity. Additionally, the use of likeness in advertisements of the film was considered merely an adjunct to the exhibition of the film and therefore, not actionable. Id.
Although many instances encompass the use of famous personalities, cases involving private individuals also arise. Recently, the Second Circuit, upheld a New York Court of Appeals ruling stating that a Plaintiff could not recover under New York’s right of privacy statute “regardless of any false implication that might be reasonably drawn from the use of her photographs to illustrate” a magazine column on sexual regrets. Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing and Publ’g, 208 F.3d 122 (2nd Cir. 2000). This decision was based on the determination that the column was newsworthy, the Plaintiff’s picture bore a relationship to the article and the article was not an “advertisement in disguise.” Id. The model whose photograph accompanied the article was not informed of its use prior to publication. Individuals are cautioned to review the pertinent statutes and/or common law in each state. The case in question was in New York, a jurisdiction which has exemptions to the laws of right of publicity which many other states do not follow.
Advertising Versus Other Use
Under the law in most states, use of a person’s name, likeness, or picture other than as part of a public event or for a newsworthy purpose would not be allowed. See, e.g., Estate of Elvis Presley v. Robb Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339 (D.Ct. N.J. 1981) where an Elvis impersonator was held to have violated the rights of the Elvis estate. In some states, misappropriation of privacy rights and publicity rights prohibit only advertising. Courts applying Tennessee and Virginia law have construed applicable statutes that way. See, e.g., Apple Corps. Ltd. v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F.Supp. 342 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (holding that a band impersonating the Beatles could not be restricted from performing its act but was restricted from advertising it). See also, Williams v. Nathan, 21 Med. L. Rptr. 1339 (E.D. Va. 1993). On the other hand, although the California statute relating to privacy and publicity rights prohibits only use of an individual’s name, likeness, or identity in advertising, the California common law dictates that individuals have such rights in situations not involving advertising. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Talisman Communs. Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4564 (C.D. Ca. 2000). In Perfect 10, the Court granted a default judgment to Plaintiff as a result of Defendant’s appropriation of photographs of Plaintiff’s assignors. The photographs were appropriated for the purpose of advertising and soliciting “sale of photographs and other works on Defendant’s website and for the purpose of selling the appropriated photographs through paid subscriptions to restricted areas of Defendant’s website.” The Court ruled that this constituted a violation of California’s right of publicity law. See also, Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 4th 536 (1993).
Unreasonable Publicity Concerning Private Facts
The tort of unreasonable publicity of private facts is applicable only where the facts being publicized are not newsworthy or, if arguably newsworthy, go beyond the “information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake.” See, e.g., Baugh v. CBS, Inc., Group W. Television, 28 F.Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993), infra. In addition, the facts must be at least relatively confidential. In Cox Communications v. Lowe, 173 Ga. App. 812, 328 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. App. 1985), a prison inmate who incidentally appeared in a television report concerning prison abuse had no claim for public disclosure of the fact that he was imprisoned as his incarceration was a matter of public record. In Batts v. Capital City Press, Inc., 479 So.2d 534 (La. App. 1985), the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that because the Plaintiff was attacked in a public place, the information was public and could not be the subject of a claim for public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993), involved a book which detailed historical events. In the book, the writer discusses the life stories of various individuals. In a section regarding a particular woman, the author disclosed information about the woman’s ex-husband. The District Court rejected the ex-husband’s claim regarding publicity given to embarrassing private facts on the grounds that the information disclosed was either public record or publicly known prior to publication of the book. On the other hand, in Baugh v. CBS Company, Inc. Group W Television, 828 F.Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993), the Court held that there was a jury question whether the producers and broadcasters of Street Stories had gone too far in publicly disclosing private facts about a woman who was the victim of spousal abuse. See also, Johnson v. Sawyer, 4 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1993), in which a Texas court held that the IRS was liable for wrongfully disclosing confidential information relating to a taxpayer’s tax return.
With the explosion of the Internet, the rights of publicity and privacy have entered a new battlefield. In a manner of seconds, photography, music and streaming video can be distributed to subscribers worldwide, posing increasing threats to the protection of these rights. Once posted on the Web, users can copy items almost instantaneously. This issue of unreasonable publicity of private facts was recently addressed in Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group Inc., et. al., 5 F.Supp. 2d 823 (D.C. Cal. 1998). Singer Bret Michaels and actress Pamela Anderson Lee sought to enjoin Defendants from disseminating videotape via the Internet of Michaels and Lee engaged in sexual intercourse. Plaintiffs filed a preliminary injunction, inter alia, for violation of right of privacy and right of publicity. The Defendant argued that Ms. Anderson’s nude appearances in magazines, movies and publicly distributed videotapes rendered the facts on the Michaels videotape no longer private. The Court disagreed concluding that the private facts depicted on the video were not public by either the “virtue of Lee’s professional appearances or by dissemination of the Tommy Lee videotape.”(4) Id. at 841. Furthermore, the Court disposed of the newsworthiness argument by noting that the “privilege to report newsworthy information is not without limit. ‘Where the publicity is so offensive as to constitute a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, it serve no legitimate public interest and is not deserving of protection’.” Id. at 840 (citing Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 at 767 (1983)). However, the United States District Court granted summary judgment to Paramount Pictures and Viacom noting that the California Supreme Court had recently restated the principle that the newsworthiness defense was to be construed broadly and reiterated that it is “not limited to high-minded discussion of politics and public affairs.” Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group Inc., et. al., 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1891(D.C. Cal. 1998).
Right to Privacy on the Internet
Right to privacy has become a fervently debated topic with the advent of the Internet. Concerns over improper use of information gathered on-line has prompted special interest groups and Congress to regulate the dissemination of personal information. The latest developments concerning privacy on the Internet relate to the passage of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 and the effect of the European Privacy Directive.
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA)
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501, et. seq. prohibits the collection and distribution of personal information regarding children under 13 and restricts distribution and use of that information. This Act became effective April 21, 2000 and rules written by the Federal Trade Commission govern its operation. The applicable rules are available in the federal register at 16 C.F.R. Part 312 and at www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html. These rules apply to Web sites that target children under 13 years old or know that personal information is being provided by children under 13 years old. For the first two years after implementation, the more verifiable forms of parental consent are only required for those activities that pose the greatest risk to the safety and privacy of children (i.e., disclosing personal information to third parties or making that information publicly available through chatrooms or similar activities). The more reliable methods are mail, use of credit cards and digital signatures. The less reliable method is e-mail from a parent (because it is easier for a child to send that form of consent and pretend it is from a parent).
European Union Privacy Directive
The European Union (EU), in its European Union Privacy Directive, has granted broad rights to individuals whose personal information is collected and stored in databases. (For the official text of the European Union Privacy Directive, see Official Journal of the European Communities of 23 November 1995 No L. 281 p. 31. For an unofficial version, visit http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EU_Directive_.html.) This EU position, based on the idea that privacy is a fundamental human right, is more rigorous than that of the United States. The United States does not provide as extensive access to individuals to review personal information and has relatively few restrictions on the its use.(5) The conflict between the EU position and the US position has threatened international electronic commerce.(6) Therefore, the US Department of Commerce negotiated with EU representatives and proposed safe harbor principles for American companies to utilize in determining whether they comply with EU data protection laws. See Joint Report on Data Protection Dialogue to the EU/US Summit, June 21, 1999. The data privacy accord “safe harbor” provision was approved in May 2000. Now, the European parliament and the European Union executive body must decide on a plan. The plan is expected to be approved in July.(7)
Major companies are now requiring sites on which they advertise to meet the European Union standards and the safe harbor provision. For example, IBM’s policy on personal information states that it will inform the consumer how it will use the personal information collected (See http://www.ibm.com/privacy/.):
At IBM, we intend to give you as much control as possible over your personal information. In general, you can visit IBM on the Web without telling us who you are or revealing any information about yourself. There are times, however, when we may need information from you, such as your name and address. It is our intent to let you know before we collect personal information from you on the Internet.
If you choose to give us personal information via the Internet that we or our business partners may need — to correspond with you, process an order or provide you with a subscription, for example – it is our intent to let you know how we will use such information. If you tell us that you do not wish to have this information used as a basis for further contact with you, we will respect your wishes. We do keep track of the domains from which people visit us. We analyze this data for trends and statistics, and then we discard it.
It is always better to obtain a written consent which permits the use of the name, likeness, or identity of any individual appearing in or who is the subject of disclosure of events in any publication or production. As outlined above, there are limited situations in which one may make such use without permission. However, because of the legal uncertainty in this area, it is necessary to have competent counsel review the situation presented prior to any such proposed use.
1 This videotape depicting sexual relations between Lee and her husband Tommy Lee was widely distributed.
2 Anne K. Mosceyunas, On-Line Privacy: The Push and Pull of Self-Regulation and Law, Computer Law Section Newsletter, State Bar of Georgia, July, August, September, 1999, pp. 13-15; Kevin A. Cranman, Internet and Electronic Communication Privacy Issues: An Overview and Legislative Update, 14th Annual Computer Law Institute, Program Materials 1999, Part 10.
3 Jane K. Winn, Digital Signatures, Smart Cards, and Electronic Payment Systems, ICLE Fourteenth Annual Computer Law Institute, Sept. 24, 1999, p. 22.
4 Jason Spingard-Koff, European Union OKs “Safe Harbor,” Wired News, May 31, 2000.
5 Relief is granted in the form of an injunction and recovery of the value of the appropriation.
6 Note that there are two other categories of the right of privacy, wrongful intrusion and false light, that are not addressed in this article.
7 Michael Higgins, A Pitch for the Right of Publicity, IP Magazine, December 1998.
Rob Hassett is an attorney with Hassett Cohen Goldstein & Port, LLP in Atlanta, Georgia.
The information above is provided for general educational purposes and not as legal advice. Laws in areas in which we practice change continually and also vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Therefore no visitor to our site should rely on any of the articles provided for legal advice, but should always consult their own attorney regarding legal matters.
© 2000, Rob Hassett, Atlanta, Georgia. All Right Reserved